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La théorie de la certitude dans Newman. Par C. BONNEGENT. (Oeuvre posthume). Publiée par M. l'Abbé Boisne. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1920.—pp. xi, 208.

This is the posthumous work of Abbé Bonnegent, a former pupil of the Catholic Institute at Paris, who served as the *curé* of a modest parish in the diocese of Bayeux, and who died in 1914. It was prepared for publication by his friend the Abbé Boisne with the approval of Professor Piat and Professor Boutroux, to whose inspiration the writing of the book is due, and who has written a preface for it. It is an excellent piece of work and well deserves the sympathetic interest which all these men have taken in it.

Part I is devoted to a clear and thorough exposition of Cardinal Newman's *Grammar of Assent*; Part II to an intelligent and searching criticism of the same. Newman, the author declares, was a sceptic in philosophy; he rejected logic and its laws, at least so far as moral and metaphysical truths are concerned. The syllogism can succeed only in the abstract sciences because in them the mind deals with its own creations; outside of them the marvelous instrument constructed by Aristotle gives us no guarantees. The English prelate thinks he has discovered a new logic; only the "illative sense" has the power to attain truth. His certitude arises from sudden inspirations, instinctive impulsions, vivid and spontaneous impressions, which in no wise resemble the ordinary processes of logic. But this is a faculty that varies according to individuals, that has no other criterion or control than itself. Hence what may satisfy one intelligence will not necessarily satisfy others.

It is true, M. Bonnegent points out, that the Cardinal does, in the end, attempt to demonstrate the beliefs which are dear to him; but he lays this seeming change of front to his anxiety to conform to the demands of the Catholic theology: his real teaching is that the finding of the truth is a gift of nature, a divination that has nothing in common with formal logic or ratiocination. Newman bases himself upon psychology, yes, upon his own personal inner experiences. His critic analyzes events of this kind, and shows that these "divinations" have their history and that they can be naturally accounted for. "Frederick II would not have been the genius we know if he had not, before mounting the throne, meditated long upon the resources of the European powers and tried to penetrate their designs. The creative thought which springs from a mind richly endowed is always derived from the habitual subjects of his study. And if one should give to a poet of genius the direction of an army, it is not probable that he would receive a special inspiration from heaven, on the field of battle, to manœuvre his troops" (pp. 184-5). "The heroes, the saints, the great political leaders who have more or less left their mark on the history of mankind,—in a word, all the men of one idea, the truly

convinced men, were not merely convinced by the vivid impression which they received from things; they knew also how to reason and to draw conclusions" (pp. 116-7). And the religious society, the Catholic Church, does not only not prohibit the profound examination of the foundations of the faith, M. Bonnegent declares in referring to thinkers and philosophers like St. Augustine and St. Thomas of Aquin; nay it prescribes it to every man who feels the need of it and who has reached a sufficient degree of intellectual development. The author prefers to take his stand with reason rather than with the kind of positivism and empiricism to which, he thinks, the compatriots of Newman have been so prone.

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A Study in the Theory of Value. By DAVID WIGHT PRALL. Berkeley, California, 1921. University of California Press, University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2,—pp. 179-290.

This lively and ingenious discussion of the theory of value constitutes a worthy addition to the excellent series of California publications in philosophy. Mr. Prall expresses his ideas in a style engaging and artistic and, on the whole, remarkably lucid. One reader, at least, has perused the monograph with unalloyed enjoyment. It is certain, however, to arouse a strong critical reaction, and perhaps that is altogether to its credit. If the reviewer's remarks in the following paragraphs run more strongly towards critical comment than seems advisable in a brief review it will be understood that he does not mean thereby to retract anything from the cordial expression of approval already set forth. Mr. Prall's argument loosens the tongue and induces good-natured criticism and retort.

"My interest in the problem of value as such," says Mr. Prall, "grew out of difficulties with apparently inadequate standards of literary criticism." And, in his first chapter on "The Question as Raised in Personal Experience," the author tells us how the problem of value presented itself to him in the field of literary criticism. Literary critics, it appears, do judge values, and judge them with reference to standards implied if not expressed. Mr. Prall takes time—for which he deserves applause—to show that this is so by adducing concrete evidence. The effect of this first chapter is to emphasize the concrete reality of the value problem, and to put the reader *en rapport* with the author's approach to the problem.

Mr. Prall holds that the problem of value must be solved through a preliminary psychological study and description of the valuing experience. The valuing experience, he urges, is found in its most typical form in moral and esthetic situations wherein objects are valued in themselves without reference to their utility as means; where objects are valued